Bulk carrier allides with dock on Mississippi
TIN news: The US National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) issued an investigation report, concerning the allision of the bulk carrier “Star of Abu Dhabi” with the Louisiana Sugar Refinery unloading dock, on the Lower Mississippi River, on 25 March 2016.
The incident
In late March 2016, the Star of Abu Dhabi, loaded with a cargo of phosphate rock, transited up the Mississippi River toward the deep draft Lower Grandview Anchorage, following a voyage from Las Palmas, Canary Islands. The vessel planned to wait in the anchorage for an open berth at the PCS Nitrogen Fertilizer Terminal, located upriver at mile marker 187.
A succession of pilots navigated the vessel to the anchorage, with the last pilot boarding the vessel at 1848 on the night before the accident. Once the pilot was on board, the master and pilot conducted a master-pilot exchange before the pilot assumed navigational control of the vessel for the final leg of the transit. The master made entries on the master-pilot exchange form including a notation that the engines were to be on “10 min notice,” but there was no information about the anchoring plan.
By 2106 on March 24, the Star of Abu Dhabi had arrived at the anchorage, the anchoring/anchor watch checklist was complete, and the pilot directed that both anchors be dropped with four shots of chain in the water. The crew dropped the port anchor first, with four shots in the water, but then dropped the starboard anchor with four shots on deck. The vessel, with a draft of 41.6 feet, was anchored about 0.4 mile upriver from the Veterans Memorial Bridge in a charted depth of 63 feet. The Carrollton gauge was still about 15 feet, making the water depth about 78 feet.
At 2154, the master was heard on the voyage data recorder (VDR) bridge audio ordering “finished with engines” on the engine order telegraph.
Finished with engines (FWE) is a standard order informing the engine room that the vessel has completed maneuvering and that the engine and associated equipment may be shut down. The order implies that there is no expectation that the engine will be required on short notice.
The pilot made no audible comment regarding FWE, but told the master to maintain a good anchor watch and to contact vessel traffic service (VTS), if there were any problems such as dragging anchors. The pilot told investigators that he directed the master to “use the rudder to keep the bow pointed toward the east bank if need be and to keep the vessel on short notice.” The pilot then departed the vessel at 2206.
The March 25 0000-0400 watch consisted of the second officer on the bridge as anchor watch, an able seaman making security rounds, and an oiler in the engine room. Included in the master’s night orders for the officer of the watch were directions to “frequently monitor ship’s position by sight and radar; any sign of dragging, call me.” The night orders did not require the main engine to be in standby while at anchor. The oiler on watch, as an unlicensed engineer, was not authorized to start the main engine.
At 0002, the second officer fixed the vessel’s position by the radar, with the ship holding steady at 0.4 mile from the Veterans Memorial Bridge. The officer noted that the current was 2.3 knots. Sometime between 0228 and 0230 the port anchor chain parted at the 35th link from the kenter shackle on the 4 th shot. The vessel’s heading swung to port, and the bulk carrier began dragging the starboard anchor at 1.7 knots. At 0236 the second officer called the master to report that the anchor was dragging. The master arrived on the bridge two minutes later and directed the second officer to call the engine room to give a 10-minute notice to bring the main engine on line.
The vessel initially moved out toward the center of the channel before drifting back towards the left descending bank of the river. As the ship drifted, its speed over ground increased, eventually reaching 3.9 knots, while its heading shifted back to starboard.
At 0239, VTS hailed the Star of Abu Dhabi and the master replied that he thought that the vessel was dragging its anchor. VTS informed the master he was authorized to maneuver the vessel with main engines to maintain the position of the vessel. VTS further instructed the captain not to weigh anchors, but to leave the anchors down.
At 0240, VTS informed the vessel that a pilot had been ordered. About the same time, a slight vibration was heard and felt as the bulk carrier’s starboard side allided with the LSR raw sugar unloading dock. A minute later, the master announced the vessel’s starboard quarter was on the LSR dock and sounded the emergency signal.
By 0243, the chief engineer was in the engine room. Four minutes later, the propulsion engine responded to a dead slow ahead command, and the vessel was brought under control about 0.1 mile from the Veterans Memorial Bridge. Track of Star of Abu Dhabi, compiled from AIS data, as it dragged anchor, allided with the LSR raw sugar unloading dock, and was brought under control 0.1 mile from the Veterans Memorial Bridge.
The pilot arrived at the vessel at 0312 and shortly thereafter the tug John Turecamo was made up to the starboard side. At 0340, the tug Beverly B joined the first tug on the bulk carrier’s starboard side and both assisted the Star of Abu Dhabi in maintaining position in the anchorage. About 4 hours later, the vessel re-anchored using its starboard anchor, with both tugs remaining alongside to keep the vessel in position.
The Star of Abu Dhabi sustained about $232,210 in damage, including a 14-foot-by-7-foot hole and heavy internal structural distortion on the starboard side between frames 190 and 195 above the water line. The port anchor and 4.5 shots (about 405 feet) of anchor chain were lost, but they were later salvaged and reattached. Damage to the LSR raw sugar unloading dock was estimated at $4.6 million.