Watchdog Report Criticizes USAF’s New Deployment Model

The U.S. Air Force rolled out a new deployment plan without an understanding of how it would impact its bases and without an effective implementation plan which led to broad confusion, a new watchdog report says.

The Government Accountability Office (GAO), in a Nov. 26 report on the new model named Air Force Force Generation (AFFORGEN), calls on senior service leadership to work to better understand the impacts of the model and improve communication about how it works.

The service in August 2021 announced the model, which shifts away from the Air Expeditionary Force model used throughout the Global War on Terrorism, in an attempt to better present forces to combatant commands and align with how the U.S. Army and Navy operate. The major shift aims to have aircraft and personnel train together before deploying, instead of crowdsourcing individuals from across the service.

It overhauls how personnel prepare to deploy, creating four six-month stages—reset for a rest and basic training, prepare for ramped-up training, ready for the most intense predeployment training, and available to commit.

In the report, the GAO highlights that the service rolled out this plan without a full understanding of how it would impact units and personnel. For example, Air Mobility Command would need to reduce the number of C-17s available to about 16 so enough of its units can be in the rest and prepare phase. But on any given day 40-50 C-17s are required to meet demands for airlift, medical evacuation, presidential transport and other needs, the report says. Bomber units also told the watchdog that they cannot go down for a reset phase because of ongoing nuclear deterrence and other taskings. This means the bombers also do not have enough time to go through needed upgrades, the report says.

The model also focuses on almost entire wings deploying at once. But this was designed without a full understanding of the needs to keep a base running. For example, when a wing at Joint Base Charleston, South Carolina, was tasked to get ready for a deployment, the number of personnel required was more than the home base could deploy. If it went through as originally planned, the base would not have enough forces to guard its gates—causing three of the seven to close.

Personnel from major commands told the GAO that the AFFORGEN model was “policy by PowerPoint presentations and emails” and a “speed of change faster than speed of communication.”

“Air Force officials at the MAJCOM [Major Command] and wing levels told us that given the magnitude of this major organizational change, they need more comprehensive guidance from HAF [Headquarters Air Force],” the report says. “In the absence of such guidance, there has been uncertainty and confusion across the service regarding AFFORGEN. In some instances, there also has been disagreement between the Air Force and some MAJCOMs over whether those MAJCOMs should transition their subordinate units to the AFFORGEN process at all.”

Going forward, the GAO recommends that the headquarters completes a service-wide assessment of minimum staffing at its bases and assesses the gaps and risks associated with reduced in-garrison support.